Title III of the Bankruptcy Amendments Act of 1984: The Substantive Changes by McDaniel, Lucinda
University of Arkansas at Little Rock Law Review 
Volume 7 Issue 4 Article 2 
1984 
Title III of the Bankruptcy Amendments Act of 1984: The 
Substantive Changes 
Lucinda McDaniel 
Follow this and additional works at: https://lawrepository.ualr.edu/lawreview 
 Part of the Bankruptcy Law Commons 
Recommended Citation 
Lucinda McDaniel, Title III of the Bankruptcy Amendments Act of 1984: The Substantive Changes, 7 U. 
ARK. LITTLE ROCK L. REV. 719 (1984). 
Available at: https://lawrepository.ualr.edu/lawreview/vol7/iss4/2 
This Comment is brought to you for free and open access by Bowen Law Repository: Scholarship & Archives. It has 
been accepted for inclusion in University of Arkansas at Little Rock Law Review by an authorized editor of Bowen 
Law Repository: Scholarship & Archives. For more information, please contact mmserfass@ualr.edu. 
COMMENT
TITLE III OF THE BANKRUPTCY AMENDMENTS ACT OF
1984: THE SUBSTANTIVE CHANGES
Lucinda McDaniel
Congress completely revised American bankruptcy law through
the Bankruptcy Reform Act of 1978. However, following implementa-
tion of the Act, problems with the bankruptcy laws persisted. In order
to correct existing errors in the bankruptcy laws and to effectuate
needed changes in the provisions, Congress enacted the Bankruptcy
Amendments Act of 1984.
The Bankruptcy Amendments Act of 1984 consists of three titles.
Title I of the Act deals with bankruptcy jurisdiction and procedures.
Title II creates bankruptcy judgeship positions, and title III makes sub-
stantive changes in the Bankruptcy Act. Only title III, the substantive
changes, will be addressed in this comment.'
Title III of the Bankruptcy Amendments of 1984 alters prior law
by amending existing provisions of the Bankruptcy Act and by adding
new provisions to deal with the increasing variety of suits falling under
bankruptcy jurisdiction. The amendments can be divided into six major
categories: consumer credit, grain storage facilities, leasehold manage-
ment, timeshare interests, collective bargaining agreements, and a
catchall miscellaneous section.
I. CONSUMER CREDIT AMENDMENTS
A. Preventing Abuse
Repetitive filing by the debtor was perhaps the most widespread
abuse of the bankruptcy system. In a typical repetitive filing situation,
I. While all amendments to the Bankruptcy Act are, of course, important, discussion of
amendments which apply to a very limited number of cases has been omitted. Areas not addressed
in this comment include amendments to the referee salary and expense fund, amendments affect-
ing repurchase agreements, amendments affecting claims subject to bona fide dispute, and a num-
ber of amendments falling into the miscellaneous category.
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the debtor would default on a residential mortgage. The creditor would
initiate foreclosure proceedings, and just before the sheriff's sale, the
debtor would file a petition in bankruptcy. If the court later dismissed
the petition or if the debtor later voluntarily dismissed the petition, the
foreclosure sale was rescheduled, and immediately the debtor would file
another petition. Thus, the debtor could by endlessly invoking the
bankruptcy laws apparently prevent the creditor from ever obtaining
possession of the property. In Cashman Investment Corp. v. Robinson,2
the debtor was allowed to file four petitions for bankruptcy in the space
of a little over a year. It was this abuse by repetitive filings that the
first amendment to the consumer credit provisions of title 11 was
designed to prevent.
The amendment to section 109' added subsection (f) which pre-
vents an individual from qualifying as a debtor if within the preceding
180 days his bankruptcy case was either dismissed by the court for
willful failure to follow court procedure or voluntarily dismissed follow-
ing the filing of a request for relief from the automatic stay." This new
subsection prohibits an individual from filing more than one petition for
bankruptcy within 180 days.
The amendment to section 7075 prevents abuse of the bankruptcy
system by granting the court authority, on its own motion, to dismiss
cases. Before being amended, section 707 provided for the dismissal of
a case only for cause consisting of either unreasonable delay by the
debtor or nonpayment of fees and charges.' A new subsection (b) was
added to section 707 to allow the court to dismiss a case when granting
relief would be a substantial abuse of the provisions of the Bankruptcy
2. 38 Bankr. 425 (Bankr. C.D. Cal. 1984).
3. 11 U.S.C. § 109 (1982).
4. Bankruptcy Amendments Act of 1984, Pub. L. No. 98-353, 1984, U.S. CODE CONG. &
AD. NEWS (98 Stat.) 352 (to be codified at 11 U.S.C. § 109) (hereinafter Bankruptcy Amend-
ments Act) provides:
Notwithstanding any other provision of this section, no individual may be a debtor
under this title who has been a debtor in a case pending under this title at any time in
the preceeding 180 days if-
(1) the case was dismissed by the court for willful failure of the debtor to abide by
orders of the court, or to appear before the court in proper prosecution of the case; or
(2) the debtor requested and obtained the voluntary dismissal of the case following the
filing of a request for relief from the automatic stay provided by section 362 of this
title.
5. II U.S.C. § 707 (1982).
6. 11 U.S.C. § 707 (1982) read: "The court may dismiss a case under this chapter only after
notice and a hearing and only for cause, including-
(I) unreasonable delay by the debtor that is prejudicial to creditors; and
(2) nonpayment of any fees and charges required under chapter 123 of title 28."
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Act.7 The amendments do not define "substantial abuse" but instead
state that the United States Supreme Court will be responsible for pre-
scribing the substantial abuse standard. 8
The amendment to section 13259 establishes the minimum amount
of future income a debtor is required to commit under his plan. Prior to
amendment, subsection (a)(3) required only that the plan be proposed
in good faith while subsection (a)(4) required that the plan be in the
best interests of the creditors.1" To meet the best interests of the credi-
tor criteria, a chapter 13 plan had to provide at least as much to the
creditor as he would receive under a chapter 7 liquidation. Debtors
took advantage of this best interests of the creditor standard to file
"zero payment plans"-plans in which a debtor claimed no non-exempt
assets to liquidate. Since the creditor would have received nothing in a
chapter 7 liquidation, he was entitled to nothing under chapter 13.
Several courts upheld "zero payment plans."'1 Other courts took a
less debtor-oriented view. In In re Estus," the Eighth Circuit Court of
Appeals explained that the good faith requirement of section
1325(a)(3) did not impose a rigid and unyielding requirement of a sub-
stantial payment to unsecured creditors. However, the court explained,
because repayment of debts is one purpose of the chapter 13 plan, a
low percentage proposal may constitute an abuse of the bankruptcy
laws.
Congress attempted to remedy this by adding a new subsection (b)
to section 1325 which prohibits the court from approving a plan to
7. Bankruptcy Amendments Act, supra note 4, at 355. Subsection (b) states:
After notice and a hearing, the court, on its own motion and not at the request or
suggestion of any party in interest, may dismiss a case filed by an individual debtor
under this chapter whose debts are primarily consumer debts if it finds that the grant-
ing of relief would be a substantial abuse of the provisions of this chapter. There shall
be a presumption in favor of granting the relief requested by the debtor.
8. Bankruptcy Amendments Act, supra note 4, at 357 explains: "The Supreme Court shall
prescribe general rules implementing the practice and procedure to be followed under section
707(b) of title 11, United States Code .
9. II U.S.C. § 1325 (1982).
10. II U.S.C. § 1325 (1982) provided:
(a) The court shall confirm a plan if- .
(3) the plan has been proposed in good faith and not by any means forbidden by law;
(4) the value, as of the effective date of the plan, of property to be distributed under the plan
on account of each allowed unsecured claim is not less than the amount that would be paid on
such claim if the estate of the debtor were liquidated under chapter 7 of this title on such date;
II. In re Esser, 22 Bankr. 814 (Bankr. E.D. Mich. 1982); In re Hildremyr, 8 Bankr. 676
(Bankr. D. S.D. 1981); In re Jenkins, 4 Bankr. 278 (Bankr. D. Colo. 1980); In re Sadler, 3 Bankr.
536 (Bankr. E.D. Ark. 1980).
12. 695 F.2d 311 (8th Cir. 1982).
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which the trustee or holder of an allowed unsecured claim objects un-
less either the claim will be paid in full or all the debtor's projected
disposable income for the three year period will be used to fund the
plan. 3 Disposable income is defined as income received by the debtor
which is not reasonably necessary to be expended for either the support
of the debtor and his dependents or for the payment of necessary busi-
ness expenses if the debtor is engaged in business.14
In order to encourage debtors to utilize the repayment provisions
of chapter 13, Congress set up a system to ensure that debtors were
apprised of the option of debt repayment under chapter 13. According
to Senator Orrin Hatch, "[i]f debtors are aware of the option of debt
repayment, it is more likely to become a more credible alternative to
liquidation." 16 Thus, section 34218 was amended by adding a new sub-
section (b) which requires that before a case is brought under title 11
by a consumer, the clerk must explain to the debtor the alternatives
under chapters 7 and 13.17
B. Restricting Exemptions
The amendments to section 52218 force joint debtors to jointly
elect either the federal or state exemptions. Before the amendments,
section 522(m) provided that exemptions applied separately with re-
spect to each debtor in a joint case.19 This allowed one spouse to elect
the federal exemptions provided in section 522(d) 20 and the other
spouse to choose the state exemptions authorized in section 522(b). 1
13. Bankruptcy Amendments Act, supra note 4, at 356. As amended, § 1325(b)(1) reads:
If the trustee or the holder of an allowed unsecured claim objects to the confirma-
tion of the plan, then the court may not approve the plan unless, as of the effective date
of the plan-
(A) the value of the property to be distributed under the plan on account of such claim
is not less than the amount of such claim; or
(B) the plan provides that all of the debtor's projected disposable income to be received
in the three-year period beginning on the date that the first payment is due under the
plan will be applied to make payments under the plan.
14. Bankruptcy Amendments Act, supra note 4, at 356.
15. 130 Cong. Rec. 5-8894 (daily ed. June 29, 1984) (statement of Sen. Hatch).
16. 11 U.S.C. § 342 (1982).
17. Bankruptcy Amendments Act, supra note 4, at 352. The amendment to § 342 adds: "(b)
Prior to the commencement of a case under this title by an individual whose debts are primarily
consumer debts, the clerk shall give written notice to such individual that indicates each chapter
of this title under which such individual may proceed."
18. 11 U.S.C. § 522 (1982).
19. 11 U.S.C. § 522(m) (1982).
20. See II U.S.C. § 522(d) (1982).
21. See II U.S.C. § 522(b) (1982).
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The Ninth Circuit Bankruptcy Appellate Panel in In re Ageton,22 held
this practice proper even though it allowed the husband to exempt the
maximum amount allowed under state law and the wife to exempt an
additional maximum amount under federal law. The California bank-
ruptcy courts agreed with this interpretation,2 3 and in fact, held a state
statute mandating that spouses elect the same type of exemptions, ei-
ther both state or both federal, unconstitutional. 4
Congress amended section 522(b) to require, in joint cases, that
the debtors elect either the state exemptions provided in section
522(b)(1) 2" or the federal exemptions provided in section
522(b)(2)(A). 6 If joint debtors cannot agree to the alternative to be
selected, they are deemed to have elected the federal exemptions. 7
Subsection (d) of section 522 was also amended to limit the
amount of personal, family, or household goods which may be ex-
empted. Prior to the amendment, no limit existed on the total value of
personal property a debtor could exempt so long as no item was valued
at more than $200.28 Thus, a debtor could exempt virtually all his per-
sonal belongings by valuing each item at less than $200. The amend-
ment now limits the amount a debtor may exempt to an aggregate of
$4000.29
In addition, section 522(d)(5) was amended to limit the unused
federal homestead exemption. Prior to amendment, section 522(d)(5)
allowed the debtor to exempt property worth up to $400 and, in addi-
tion, utilize any amount not exempted under (d)(1) up to $7500 in
22. 14 Bankr. 833 (Bankr. 9th Cir. 1981).
23. See In re Skipwith, 9 Bankr. 730 (Bankr. S.D. Cal. 1981).
24. In re Lee, 22 Bankr. 977 (Bankr. C.D. Cal. 1982).
25. II U.S.C. § 522(b)(1) (1982). Section 522(b)(1) allows the debtor to exempt eleven
specific types of property listed in § 522(d).
26. II U.S.C. § 522(b)(2)(A) (1982). Section 522(b)(2)(A) allows the debtor to exempt
"any property that is exempt under Federal law, other than subsection (d) of this section .... "
27. Bankruptcy Amendments Act, supra note 4, at 353. The amendment to § 522(b)
provides:
[I1n joint cases filed under section 302 of this title and individual cases filed under
section 301 or 303 of this title by or against debtors who are husband and wife, and
whose estates are ordered to be jointly administered . . . one debtor may not elect to
exempt property listed in paragraph (1) and the other debtor elect to exempt property
listed in paragraph (2) of this subsection. If the parties cannot agree on the alternative
to be elected, they shall be deemed to elect paragraph (1). . ..
28. See I I U.S.C. § 522(d)(3) (1982).
29. Bankruptcy Amendments Act, supra note 4, at 353. II U.S.C. § 522(d)(3) now allows
exemption of the debtor's interest, not to exceed $200 in value in any particular item or $4000 in
aggregate value in household furnishings, household goods, wearing apparel, appliances, books,
animals, crops, or musical instruments, that are held primarily for the personal, family, or house-
hold use of the debtor or a dependent of the debtor.
1984]
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value." The amendment limits the exemption of aggregate interest in
property to $400 plus up to $3750 of any unused amount of the home-
stead exemption in subsection (1).31
C. Limiting Discharge
The amendment to section 523(a)(2) 32 prevents the debtor from
discharging some debts incurred immediately before and in contempla-
tion of bankruptcy. Before the amendment, section 523(a)(2) required
proof of false pretenses, false representation, or actual fraud to deny
discharge of debts incurred immediately prior to bankruptcy. 3 A new
subsection (c) is added to section 523(a)(2) to prevent the discharge of
debts incurred by the consumer for luxury goods or services which ag-
gregate more than $500 and which were incurred on or within 40 days
before the order for relief.3 ' Luxury goods are defined as non-necessi-
ties: " 'luxury goods or services' do not include goods or services reason-
ably acquired for the support or maintenance of the debtor or a depen-
dent of the debtor . . .-.
A second type of debt made nondischargeable by the amendment
30. 11 U.S.C. § 522(d) provided that the following property could be exempted:
(5) The debtor's aggregate interest, not to exceed in value $400 plus any unused
amount of the exemption provided under paragraph (1) of this subsection in any
property.
Subsection (1) provided for an exemption of:
The debtor's aggregate interest, not to exceed $7500 in value, in real property or
personal property that the debtor or a dependent of the debtor uses as a residence
31. Bankruptcy Amendments Act, supra note 4, at 353. The amendment to 11 U.S.C. §
522(d)(5) allows the debtor to exempt his "aggregate interest in any property, not to exceed in
value $400 plus up to $3,750 of any unused amount of the exemption provided under paragraph
(1) of this subsection.
32. I1 U.S.C. § 523(a)(2) (1982).
33. 11 U.S.C. § 523(a)(2)(A) (1978) provided: "A discharge ...does not discharge an
individual debtor from any debt ... for obtaining money, property, services, or an extension,
renewal, or refinance of credit, by .. .false pretenses, a false representation, or actual fraud
34. Bankruptcy Amendments Act, supra note 4, at 353. The amendment to 11 U.S.C. §
523(a)(2) states:
[C]onsumer debts owed to a single creditor and aggregating more than $500 for 'luxury
goods or services' incurred by an individual debtor on or within forty days before the
order for relief under this title, or cash advances aggregating more than $1,000 that are
extensions of consumer credit under an open end credit plan obtained by an individual
debtor on or within twenty days before the order for relief under this title, are pre-
sumed to be nondischargeable; 'luxury goods or services' do not include goods or ser-
vices reasonably acquired for the support or maintenance of the debtor or a dependent
of the debtor . . ..
35. Id.
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to section 523(a)(2) is the obtaining of cash advances aggregating
more than $1000 under an open end credit plan within 20 days before
the order for relief.3 6
The amendment to section 523(a) prohibits discharge of debts in-
curred as a result of drunk driving. Congress amended section 523(a)
as a direct response to cases such as In re Kuepper.37 In Kuepper, a
judgment against the debtor resulting from the debtor's operating a
motor vehicle while intoxicated was discharged in bankruptcy. The
court explained that discharge under the Code was only precluded for a
debt arising from willful and malicious actions. 8 Because drunk driv-
ing was not willful and malicious, that debt could be discharged. The
new subparagraph (9) added to section 523(a) specifically denies the
discharge of any debt incurred by the debtor as a result of his operat-
ing a motor vehicle while legally intoxicated.39
D. Procedural Changes
A reaffirmation agreement must meet three requirements under
the amendment to section 524(c). First, the agreement to reaffirm the
debt must contain a clear and conspicuous statement of the debtor's
rights regarding rescission.40 Second, the agreement must be filed with
36. Id.
37. 36 Bankr. 680 (Bankr. E.D. Wis. 1983).
38. Id. at 682.
39. Bankruptcy Amendments Act, supra note 4, at 364. Subparagraph (9) denies discharge:
to any entity, to the extent that such debt arises from a judgment or consent decree
entered in a court of record against the debtor wherein liability was incurred by such
debtor as a result of the debtor's operation of a motor vehicle while legally intoxicated
under the laws or regulations of any jurisdiction within the United States or its territo-
ries wherein such motor vehicle was operated and within which such liability was in-
curred ....
40. Bankruptcy Amendments Act, supra note 4, at 354. The amendments to § 524(c) require
that:
(2) such agreement contains a clear and conspicuous statement which advises the
debtor that the agreement may be rescinded at any time prior to discharge or within
sixty days after such agreement is filed with the court, whichever occurs later, by giving
notice of rescission to the holder of such claim;
(3) such agreement has been filed with the court and, if applicable, accompanied by
a declaration or an affidavit of the attorney that represented the debtor during the
course of negotiating an agreement under this subsection, which states that such
agreement-
(A) represents a fully informed and voluntary agreement by the debtor; and
(B) does not impose an undue hardship on the debtor or a dependent of the debtor;
(4) the debtor has not rescinded such agreement at any time prior to discharge or
within sixty days after such agreement is filed with the court, whichever occurs later, by
giving notice of rescission to the holder of such claim; . ..
UALR LAW JOURNAL
the court along with an affidavit filed by the attorney for the debtor
stating that the reaffirmation agreement was entered into knowingly
and voluntarily and does not impose undue hardship on the debtor."1
And, third, the debtor is given the right to rescind the agreement prior
to discharge or within 60 days after the agreement is filed with the
court."2
Former section 524(c)(4) is redesignated section 524(c)(6) and
amended to provide in subsection (A) for enforcement of an agreement
entered into by one not represented by an attorney if the court finds the
agreement does not impose undue hardship on the debtor and is in the
best interest of the debtor.' This subsection (A), however, does not
apply to a consumer debt secured by real property."" Thus, a debtor
must be represented by counsel when reaffirming a debt secured by real
property.
Extensive revisions have been made by Congress in the disclosure
requirements of section 521. Before amendment, section 521 required
the debtor to file a list of creditors, a schedule of assets and liabilities,
and a statement of financial affairs. 4'5 The amendment to subsection (1)
adds the additional duty of providing a schedule of current income and
current expenditures.' 6
A new paragraph (2) of section 521 sets out the procedural duties
of a debtor whose schedule of assets and liabilities includes consumer
debts secured by property of the estate. The debtor must within 30
days file with the clerk a statement of intention with respect to the
retention or surrender of property subject to secured claims. 47 In this
41. Id.
42. Id.
43. Bankruptcy Amendments Act, supra note 4, at 354. The amendment to § 524(c)(6)
reads:
(A) in a case concerning an individual who was not represented by an attorney during
the course of negotiating an agreement under this subsection, the court approves such
agreement as-
(i) not imposing an undue hardship on the debtor or a dependent of the debtor; and
(ii) in the best interest of the debtor.
44. Bankruptcy Amendments Act, supra note 4, at 354. The amendment to § 524(c)(6)(B)
reads; "Subparagraph (A) shall not apply to the extent that such debt is a consumer debt secured
by real property."
45. 11 U.S.C. § 521(1) (1982).
46. See Bankruptcy Amendments Act, supra note 4, at 352.
47. Id. at 352-53. The new provision of § 521 states:
(2) if an individual debtor's schedule of assets and liabilities includes consumer
debts which are secured by property of the estate-
(A) within thirty days after the date of the filing of a petition under chapter 7 of
this title or on or before the date of the meeting of creditors, whichever is earlier, or
within such additional time as the court, for cause, within such period fixes, the debtor
[Vol. 7:719
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statement, the debtor may claim the property as exempt, state that he
intends to redeem the property, or announce that he intends to reaffirm
the debts secured by the property.48 Additionally, within 45 days of the
filing of this notice of intent, the debtor must perform his stated inten-
tion with respect to the property. 49 The end result of this procedure
should be to assist the secured creditor in determining what the debtor
will do with the collateral and save the creditor the costs of filing mo-
tions to force the debtor to commit to a decision.
Secured parties are allowed to proceed against property of the
debtor following discharge. Prior to amendment, section 524(a)(2) pro-
vided that a discharge prohibited the commencement or continuation of
an action to collect, recover, or offset a debt as a personal liability of
the debtor and also prohibited a suit to collect from the property of the
debtor. 50 The court in In re Williams 1 construed this section to pro-
hibit a creditor from enforcing pre-petition liens (not invalidated by
bankruptcy) against debtors or their property unless the debtor reaf-
firmed his debt. Congress apparently overruled Williams by amending
section 524(a)(2) to allow secured parties to levy against property serv-
ing as collateral once the order of discharge is entered. 5
E. Protecting the Debtor
Section 525 of the Bankruptcy Act prohibited public agencies
from discriminating against individuals whose debts were discharged in
bankruptcy. 583 The 1984 amendment to section 525 adds new subsection
shall file with the clerk a statement of his intention with respect to the retention or
surrender of such property and, if applicable, specifying that such property is claimed
as exempt, that the debtor intends to redeem such property, or that the debtor intends
to reaffirm debts secured by such property;
(B) within forty-five days after the filing of a notice of intent under this section, or
within such additional time as the court, for cause, within such forty-five day period
fixes, the debtor shall perform his intention with respect to such property . ...
48. Id.
49. Id.
50. II U.S.C. § 524(a)(2) (1982) provided that a discharge "operates as an injunction
against the commencement or continuation of an action, the employment of process, or any act, to
collect, recover or offset any such debt as a personal liability of the debtor, or from property of the
debtor, whether or not discharge of such debt is waived;.
51. 9 Bankr. 228 (Bankr. D. Kan. 1981).
52. Bankruptcy Amendments Act, supra note 4, at 354.
53. II U.S.C. § 525 (1982) provided:
[A] governmental unit may not deny, revoke, suspend, or refuse to renew a license,
permit, charter, franchise, or other similar grant to, condition such grant against, deny
employment to, terminate the employment of, or discriminate with respect to employ-
ment against, a person that is or has been a debtor under this title or a bankrupt or a
19841
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(b) which prohibits a private employer from either terminating the em-
ployment of or discriminating with the respect to employment of the
debtor because the individual (1) is or has been a debtor under title 11
of the Bankruptcy Act, (2) has been insolvent before or during a case
under title 11, or (3) has not paid a debt which is dischargeable under
title 11 or that was discharged under the Bankruptcy Act."
The amendment to section 1322 allows special treatment of the
unsecured claims of a co-debtor. Section 1322 requires that a chapter
13 plan not discriminate unfairly against any class of unsecured
claims. 5 This restriction was interpreted to prohibit the debtor from
separately classifying for favorable treatment unsecured claims on
which there was co-debtor. In In re Iacovoni,"1 the court held that the
bankruptcy code does not allow separate classifications of unsecured
claims based solely on the presence of a co-debtor.57 According to the
court, it would be an arbitrary classification to pay one unsecured cred-
itor 100% while the rest are paid nothing solely because of the exis-
tence of a co-debtor.5 8
Congress overruled lacovoni by amending section 1322(b)(1). The
amendment expressly allows the payment plan to treat unsecured
claims differently when a co-debtor exists.5 9 Therefore, a co-debtor of a
consumer debt may be paid in full to the exclusion of other unsecured
creditors.
The amendment to section 362 codifies the practice of bankruptcy
judges holding creditors in contempt for knowing and intentional viola-
tions of automatic stay and awarding any resulting damages to the
debtor. The most prominent case setting out this judge-made rule is
Fidelity Mortgage Investors v. Camelia Builders.0 In Fidelity, a real
estate investment trust petitioned for reorganization under chapter 11.
debtor under the Bankruptcy Act, or another person with whom such bankrupt or
debtor has been associated, solely because such bankrupt or debtor is or has been a
debtor under this title or a bankrupt or debtor under the Bankruptcy Act, has been
insolvent before the commencement of the case under this title, or during the case but
before the debtor is granted or denied a discharge, or has not paid a debt that is dis-
chargeable in a case under this title or that was discharged under the Bankruptcy Act.
54. Bankruptcy Amendments Act, supra note 4, at 355.
55. I1 U.S.C. § 1322(b)(1) (1982) stated that a plan may "(1) designate a class or classes of
unsecured claims . . . but may not discriminate unfairly against any class so designated;
56. 2 Bankr. 256 (Bankr. D. Utah 1980).
57. Id. at 260.
58. Id. at 261.
59. Bankruptcy Amendments Act, supra note 4, at 356. The amendment to § 1322(b)(1)
allows the plan to "treat claims for a consumer debt of the debtor if an individual is liable on such
consumer debt with the debtor differently than other unsecured claims."
60. 550 F.2d 47 (2d Cir. 1976), cert. denied, 429 U.S. 1093 (1977).
[Vol. 7:719
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The creditors sued the debtor in state court without first receiving the
permission of the bankruptcy court. The court held this filing to be a
willful violation of the procedure established by the bankruptcy rules
and required the creditors to pay all costs, including attorneys' fees,
resulting from the action. 1
Congress added subsection (h) to section 362 to give the debtor
statutory recourse against persons violating the automatic stay. The
amendment permits the debtor to recover actual damages, including
costs and attorneys' fees, and if appropriate, punitive damages, from
one who willfully violates the stay. 2
An additional amendment expedites relief from the automatic
stay. A new subsection (d) added to section 1301 provides that 20 days
after the filing of a request for relief from an automatic stay, the stay
will be lifted unless the debtor or some other party liable on the debt
files a written objection to the termination of the stay. 3
F. Conflict of Interest
The amendment to section 1103 of the consumer credit provisions
of the Bankruptcy Code clarifies when a conflict of interest exists for
an attorney in a bankruptcy proceeding. Before amendment, section
1103(b) provided that any person employed to represent a committee
could not represent any other entity in connection with the case. 4 The
amendment narrows the language and application of this subsection.
The words "a person" are changed to "an attorney or accountant"
making it clear that the persons restricted under this provision are only
attorneys and accountants.6 5 The amendment also emphasizes that an
accountant or attorney may represent the committee and another entity
unless an actual conflict of interest exists.6 6 A new sentence was added
to section 1103(b) to explain that representation of one or more credi-
tors of the same class as the committee is not per se a conflict of inter-
est resulting in automatic disqualification of the attorney or
61. Id. at 58.
62. Bankruptcy Amendments Act, supra note 4, at 352.
63. Id. at 355-56.
64. 11 U.S.C. § 1103(b)(1978) read: "A person employed to represent a committee ap-
pointed under section 1102 of this title may not, while employed by such committee, represent any
other entity in connection with the case."
65. Bankruptcy Amendments Act, supra note 4, at 358.
66. Id. at 384.
1984]
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accountant.6 7
II. AMENDMENTS RELATING TO GRAIN STORAGE
FACILITIES BANKRUPTCY
A. Protecting the Grain Producer
Prompted by cases such as Missouri v. U.S. Bankruptcy Court 8
and In re Cox Cotton Co.,"9 Congress amended the Bankruptcy Act to
protect grain producers whose grain was stored in bankrupt grain ele-
vators. The amendment to section 507(a) gives grain producers a prior-
ity claim of $2000 per individual for the grain deposited or proceeds of
the grain.70
Amended section 546 protects a grain producer who sells his grain
to an insolvent storage operator. A new subsection (d) of section 546
reserves to grain producers, as against the trustee, all statutory and
common law rights to reclaim grain received by the debtor storage op-
erator while insolvent. 71 Two subsections qualify this grant. Section
546(d)(1) requires that the grain producer demand reclamation in
writing within ten days after the debtor receives the grain in order to
recover the grain.7 2 And, in section 546(d)(2) the bankruptcy court
may deny reclamation if the court secures the claim by a lien. 3
67. Id. The new sentence added to § 1103(b) reads as follows: "Representation of one or
more creditors of the same class as represented by the committee shall not per se constitute the
representation of an adverse interest."
68. 647 F.2d 768 (8th Cir. 1981).
69. 24 Bankr. 930 (Bankr. E.D Ark. 1982). In both Missouri v. U.S. Bankruptcy Court and
In re Cox Cotton Co., bankruptcy courts authorized the sale of grain held in bankrupt storage
facilities. The grain producers then used self help to recover possession of the grain.
70. Bankruptcy Amendments Act, supra note 4, at 358. The amendment to § 507(a) gives a
priority to "allowed unsecured claims of persons-
(A) engaged in the production or raising of grain. . . against a debtor who owns or operates a
grain storage facility . . . for grain or the proceeds of grain . . . but only to the extent of $2000
for each such individual."
71. Bankruptcy Amendments Act, supra note 4, at 358-59. Section 546(d) reads as follows:
In the case of the seller who is a producer of grain sold to a grain storage facility,
owned or operated by the debtor, in the ordinary course of such seller's business ...
the rights and powers of the trustee . . . are subject to any statutory or common law
right of such producer . . . to reclaim such grain . . . if the debtor has received such
grain . . . while insolvent, but-
(I) such producer . . . may not reclaim any grain ...unless such producer ..
demands, in writing, reclamation of such grain . . . before ten days after receipt
thereof by the debtor; and
(2) the court may deny reclamation to such a producer. . . with a right of reclama-
tion that has made such a demand only if the court secures such claim by a lien.
72. Id.
73. Id.
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B. Expediting the Disposition of Grain
A new section 557 was added to title 11 expressly to expedite the
disposition of grain stored in bankrupt facilities. The expedited proce-
dure is designed both to prevent spoilage of the grain and to avoid the
effect of adverse market conditions. Section 557(c)(1) requires that
rights in the stored grain be determined within 120 days. 4 This 120
day limitation may be extended only as allowed in subsection (f) which
permits delay in two situations: when the interests of justice so require
or when the interests of the claimants will not be materially injured. 75
Additionally, subsection (d)(2) of section 557 requires the trustee to
process the claims of grain producers within the same expedited 120
day deadline.71 Subsection (g) prohibits the court and the trustee from
delaying any proceeding in the expedited case due to an appeal. 77
III. LEASEHOLD MANAGEMENT AMENDMENTS
A. Maintaining the Status Quo in Shopping Centers
The Bankruptcy Act of 1898 was interpreted to allow a landlord to
include a termination provision in his lease. When a tenant filed a peti-
tion in bankruptcy, the landlord terminated the tenant's leasehold in-
terest.78 This termination provision was known as an ipso facto clause,
as the mere fact that a tenant filed a petition in bankruptcy allowed the
landlord to terminate the lease.
Finding this practice harsh, the courts fashioned exceptions to en-
forcement of the automatic termination clauses. In the leading case of
Queens Boulevard Wine & Liquor Corp. v. Blum, 9 the court held that
a lease provision permitting the landlord to terminate the lease on the
debtor's filing for bankruptcy was grossly inequitable and, therefore,
unenforceable. In the Bankruptcy Amendments Act of 1984, Congress
made the Queens Boulevard doctrine applicable to all bankruptcy cases
74. Bankruptcy Amendments Act, supra note 4, at 359.
75. Id. at 360.
76. Id.
77. Id. A new subsection (g) is added to Bankruptcy Rule 3001 to make a warehouse receipt
or equivalent document prima facie evidence of the validity and amount of the claim of ownership
of a quantity of grain. The amendment to Bankruptcy Rule 3001 reads as follows:
To the extent not inconsistent with the United States Warehouse Act or applicable
State law, a warehouse receipt, scale ticket, or similar document of the type routinely
issued as evidence of title by a grain storage facility . . . shall constitute prima facie
evidence of the validity and amount of a claim of ownership of a quantity of grain.
78. See Bankruptcy Act § 70(b) (1898).
79. 503 F.2d 202 (2d Cir. 1974).
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thus preventing automatic termination of leases; however, special con-
cessions were granted to shopping center developers under section 365
of the Bankruptcy Amendments Act.
Section 365(b)(3) was amended to expand the duty of the lessee to
give adequate assurance of performance under a lease of real property
in a shopping center.80 Prior to amendment, section 365(b)(3)(A) re-
quired only that the lessee give adequate assurance of the source of
rent and other consideration due under the lease.8 1 Now, the lessee
must also give adequate assurance that, if he assigns the lease, the as-
signee will continue in the same financial condition and operating per-
formance as the lessee.82
Before amendment, section 365(b)(3)(C) required only that assur-
ance be given that assignment of a commercial lease would not breach
any provision in any other lease, financing agreement, or master agree-
ment in the shopping center.83 As amended, subsection (C) requires
that all provisions in a lease remain intact on assignment and that the
assignment not breach any provision contained in any other lease, fi-
nancing agreement, or master agreement of the shopping center.84
B. Termination of the Lease Prior to Bankruptcy
Some bankruptcy courts refused to allow a lessor to evict his lessee
from a shopping center when the lease terminated before the institution
of a bankruptcy action. Therefore, a new subsection (9) was added to
section 362(b) to make clear that an automatic stay does not prevent
any act by the lessor to obtain possession of property when the lease
has terminated by its own terms before commencement of bankruptcy
80. Bankruptcy Amendments Act, supra note 4, at 362. Section 365(b)(3) now requires that
the lessee give adequate assurance
(A) of the source of rent and other consideration due under such lease, and in the case
of an assignment, that the financial condition and operating performance of the pro-
posed assignee and its guarantors, if any, shall be similar to the financial condition and
operating performance of the debtor and its guarantors, if any, as of the time the debtor
became the lessee under the lease;
(B) That any percentage rent due under such lease will not decline substantially;
(C) that assumption or assignment of such lease is subject to all the provisions thereof,
including (but not limited to) provisions such as a radius, location, use, or exclusivity
provision, and will not breach any such provision contained in any other lease, financing
agreement, or master agreement relating to such shopping center; and
(D) that assumption or assignment of such lease will not disrupt any tenant mix or
balance in such shopping center.
81. 11 U.S.C. § 365(b)(3)(A) (1982).
82. II U.S.C. § 365(b)(3)(C) (1982).
83. Id.
84. Id.
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proceedings.85 This amendment allows the landlord to evict his tenant
in state court without leave of the bankruptcy court when the lease has
expired prior to the filing of the petition.
When a lease expires before or during a bankruptcy suit, the lease-
hold will no longer be included in the debtor's estate. A new subsection
(2) was added to section 541(b) to exclude from the debtor's estate any
interest of the debtor as lessee of nonresidential real property which has
terminated either before the commencement of the bankruptcy suit or
during the pendency of the case.86
Though the amendments address only the termination of a lease
through expiration of time, case law permits a landlord to evict his
tenant following termination due to default on the lease prior to bank-
ruptcy. In In re Mimi's of Atlanta, Inc.,8" the lessee failed to make
rental payments under a valid lease. The landlord terminated the lease,
but the debtor filed for bankruptcy before the landlord could evict him.
The court granted the landlord relief from the automatic stay and al-
lowed him to proceed with his action to reclaim the property.
The termination of a lease prior to bankruptcy also restricts the
rights of the trustee. A new subsection (3) is added to section
365(c)(1)(B) to prevent a trustee from either assuming or assigning an
executory contract or unexpired lease of nonresidential real property if
the lease has terminated under nonbankruptcy law before the order for
relief.88
C. Election as to Unexpired Leases
The amendments to section 365(d) force the debtor or trustee to
make an election to assume or reject an unexpired lease within 60 days
after the order for relief.89 Prior to the amendment, the trustee or
85. Bankruptcy Amendments Act, supra note 4, at 364. The amendment to § 362(b) states
that the filing of a petition does not operate as a stay "of any act by a lessor to the debtor under a
lease of nonresidential real property that has terminated by the expiration of the stated term of
the lease before the commencement of or during a case under this title to obtain possession of such
property."
86. Bankruptcy Amendments Act, supra note 4, at 363. The amendment to § 541(b) reads:
Property of the estate does not include . . . (2) any interest of the debtor as a lessee
under a lease of nonresidential real property that has terminated at the expiration of
the stated term of such lease before the commencement of the case under this title, and
ceases to include any interest of the debtor as a lessee under a lease of nonresidential
real property that has terminated at the expiration of the stated term of such lease
during the case.
87. 5 Bankr. 623 (Bankr. N.D. Ga. 1980).
88. Bankruptcy Amendments Act, supra note 4, at 362.
89. Id. at 362-63. The amendment to § 365(d)(1) provides:
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debtor could wait until the confirmation of the plan to decide whether
to assume an unexpired lease,9" and if the lessor wanted an earlier deci-
sion, he was forced to apply to the court for an order compelling the
debtor or trustee to assume, assign, or reject the lease.
The failure of the trustee to act within the prescribed time period
is addressed in the amendment to section 365. A new subsection (4) is
added to section 365(d) to provide that if the trustee does not assume
or reject an unexpired lease of nonresidential real property within 60
days of the order of relief, the lease is deemed rejected.91 Failure to act
within 60 days forces the trustee to immediately surrender the property
to the lessor.92 In addition, a new subsection (1) supplements section
365 by permitting the lessor to require a deposit or other form of secur-
ity for performance from the assignee of an unexpired lease just as he
would have required from an initial lessee.9"
IV. AMENDMENTS TO PROTECT TIMESHARE
CONSUMERS
The decision in In re Sombrero Reef Club, Inc.94 led to the crea-
tion of the amendments to protect timeshare consumers. In Sombrero
Reef Club, the court held that timeshare contracts were mere execu-
tory contracts and as such could be rejected by the debtor so that the
property could be sold free of these interests.95 Even where a purchase
price had been paid in full, the court held the contract executory and
recognized no possessory right in the timeshare participant.96
To remedy this unconscionable result, Congress began by adding
subsection (43) to section 101 to define a timeshare plan and timeshare
interest. A timeshare plan is an arrangement whereby a purchaser, in
exchange for consideration, receives a right to use accommodations, fa-
if the trustee does not assume or reject an executory contract or unexpired lease of
residential real property or of personal property of the debtor within 60 days after the
order for relief, or within such additional time as the court, for cause, within such 60-
day period, fixes, then such contract or lease is deemed rejected.
90. See 11 U.S.C. § 365(d)(2) (1982).
91. Bankruptcy Amendments Act, supra note 4, at 363.
92. Id.
93. Id. at 373. The new subsection to § 365 reads:
If an unexpired lease under which the debtor is the lessee is assigned pursuant to
this section, the lessor of the property may require a deposit or other security for the
performance of the debtor's obligations under the lease substantially the same as would
have been required by the landlord upon the initial leasing to a similar tenant.
94. 18 Bankr. 612 (Bankr. S.D. Fla. 1982).
95. Id. at 616.
96. Id.
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cilities, or recreational sites for a specific period of time which is less
than a full year in any given year and which extends for a period of
more than three years. 7 A timeshare interest is that interest purchased
in a timeshare plan. 98
The holder of a timeshare interest has the option to be treated as a
lessee or as a purchaser of real property. The timeshare participant
who elects to be treated as a lessee is bound by the provisions of section
365(h). Section 365(h), before amendment, allowed a lessee to treat a
lease as terminated on rejection by the debtor.99 This same right of
termination is granted by amendment to a timeshare participant when
a trustee rejects a timeshare interest. 100 In the alternative, the
timeshare participant may, as may the lessee, remain in possession of
the property for the balance of the agreed term and for any renewal or
extension under the timeshare interests.101
The amendment to section 365(h)(2) grants certain rights to the
timeshare participant, or lessee, who elects to remain in possession of
the timeshare interest following rejection by the trustee. The timeshare
participant may, as may the lessee, offset against the payments due for
the timeshare interest any damages occurring after rejection by the
trustee caused by the nonperformance of the debtor of obligations due
under the timeshare plan. 102 However, after rejection, the timeshare
participant's recovery against the estate is limited to the offset.103
The timeshare participant who elects to be treated as a purchaser
of real property is governed by section 365(i). The amendment to this
section parallels the amendment to subsection (h) to allow the pur-
chaser of a timeshare interest, 04 like the purchaser of real property, to
consider the contract to purchase as terminated when the trustee re-
jects the executory contract. 10 5 In the alternative, the purchaser of the
97. Bankruptcy Amendments Act, supra note 4, at 366-67.
98. Id.
99. II U.S.C. § 365(h)(1) (1982).
100. Bankruptcy Amendments Act, supra note 4, at 367. Following amendment, § 365(h)(1)
reads:
If the trustee rejects an unexpired lease of real property of the debtor under which
the debtor is the lessor, or a timeshare interest under a timeshare plan under which the
debtor is the timeshare interest seller, the lessee or timeshare interest purchaser under
such lease or timeshare plan may treat such lease or timeshare plan as terminated by
such rejection . ..
101. Bankruptcy Amendments Act, supra note 4, at 367.
102. Id. at 367.
103. Id.
104. 11 U.S.C. § 365(i)(2).
105. Bankruptcy Amendments Act, supra note 4, at 367.
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timeshare interest, like the purchaser of real property, may remain in
possession of the timeshare interest and set off his damages against the
unpaid installments of the purchase price.106
V. REJECTION OF COLLECTIVE BARGAINING
AGREEMENTS
Inconsistent decisions in two cases prompted Congress to amend
the Bankruptcy Act to establish standards for rejecting collective bar-
gaining agreements. In 1975, the Second Circuit decided Brotherhood
of Railway Employees v. REA Express, Inc. .107 In REA Express, the
court characterized a collective bargaining agreement as an executory
contract and allowed the debtor to unilaterally reject the contract only
if rejection was necessary to prevent liquidation. Believing that the
standard in REA Express was "fundamentally at odds with the policies
of flexibility and equity built into" the bankruptcy code,10 8 the United
States Supreme Court handed down a new standard for rejection of
collective bargaining agreements in NLRB v. Bildisco & Bildisco.109
Instead of the strict test of REA Express, the court in Bildisco allowed
the debtor to reject a collective bargaining agreement on a showing
only that the agreement burdened the estate and that the equities bal-
anced in favor of rejection.110
Congress created section 1113 of title 11 to control the rejection of
collective bargaining agreements. Any proposal to alter a collective
bargaining agreement must be needed to permit the debtor's reorgani-
zation and must assure that all parties are treated fairly and equita-
bly."' To this end, subsection (b)(1) of section 1113 requires the trus-
tee to follow specific procedural steps when seeking to reject a
106. Bankruptcy Amendments Act, supra note 4, at 365.
107. 523 F.2d 164 (2d Cir.), cert. denied, 423 U.S. 1017 (1975).
108. NLRB v. Bildisco & Bildisco, 104 S. Ct. 1188, 1196 (1984).
109. 104 S. Ct. 1188 (1984).
110. Id. at 1196.
Ill. Bankruptcy Amendments Act, supra note 4, at 390. Section 1113(b)(1) provides:
Subsequent to filing a petition and prior to filing an application seeking a rejection of a
collective bargaining agreement, the debtor in possession or trustee . . . shall-
(A) make a proposal to the authorized representative of the employees covered by
such agreement, based on the most complete and reliable information available at the
time of such proposal, which provides for those necessary modifications in the employ-
ees benefits and protections that are necessary to permit the reorganization of the
debtor and assures that all creditors, the debtor and all of the affected parties are
treated fairly and equitably; and
(B) provide . . . the representative of the employees with such relevant information
as is necessary to evaluate the proposal.
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collective bargaining agreement. Under subsection (b)(1), the trustee
must, subsequent to the filing of a petition and prior to filing an appli-
cation seeking rejection of the agreement, (A) make a proposal to the
authorized representative for modifications of employee benefits and
protections and (B) provide the representative with all information nec-
essary to evaluate the proposal.112 Subsection (b)(2) forces the trustee
or debtor-in-possession to meet with the authorized representative of
the union to attempt in good faith to reach a mutually satisfactory
modification of the collective bargaining agreement.'1 3
Section 1113(c) sets out three requirements for allowing rejection
of a union contract. The court may allow rejection of the agreement
only if (1) the trustee has made the proposal required in (b)(1); (2) the
authorized representative has without good cause refused to accept the
proposal; and (3) equity clearly favors rejection of the agreement." 4
The procedure to be followed when attempting to reject a collec-
tive bargaining agreement is set out in section 1113(d). Subsection
(d)(1) requires the court to hold a hearing within fourteen days of the
filing of an application for rejection of a collective bargaining agree-
ment." ' All interested parties may appear, and notice must be given to
such parties at least ten days before the hearing." 6 "[W]here the cir-
cumstances of the case, and the interests of justice require" more time
for negotiations, the court may extend the deadline for the hearing." 7
Section 1113(d)(2) requires the court to rule on the application for
112. Bankruptcy Amendments Act, supra note 4, at 390.
113. Id.
114. Id.
115. Id. at 390-91. Section ll13(d) reads:
(I) Upon the filing of an application for rejection the court shall schedule a hearing
to be held not later than fourteen days after the date of the filing of such application.
All interested parties may appear and be heard at such hearing. Adequate notice shall
be provided to such parties at least ten days before the date of such hearing. The court
may extend the time for the commencement of such hearing for a period not exceeding
seven days where the circumstances of the case, and the interests of justice require such
extension, or for additional periods of time to which the trustee and representative
agree.
(2) The court shall rule on such application for rejection within thirty days after the
date of the commencement of the hearing. In the interests of justice, the court may
extend such time for ruling for such additional period as the trustee and the employees'
representative may agree to. If the court does not rule on such application within thirty
days after the date of the commencement of the hearing, or within such additional time
as the trustee and the employees' representative may agree to, the trustee may termi-
nate or alter any provisions of the collective bargaining agreement pending the ruling of
the court on such application.
116. Bankruptcy Amendments Act, supra note 4, at 390-91.
117. Id.
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rejection within 30 days from the commencement of the hearing.118 If
the court does not rule within 30 days, the trustee may terminate or
alter the provisions of the collective bargaining agreement pending the
ruling of the court." 9
Section 1113(e) recognizes the interim changes in the provisions of
the collective bargaining agreement may be necessary. After notice and
a hearing, the court may allow such interim changes in the agreement
if irreparable damage would result to the debtor's business or estate. 2'
Subsection (f) makes clear that no trustee may unilaterally terminate
or alter any provisions of the collective bargaining agreement without
prior court approval. 2 '
VI. MISCELLANEOUS AMENDMENTS
A number of amendments to the Bankruptcy Act, though they do
not fall neatly into any given category, are important and deserve
attention.
A. Preferences
Before the amendments, the trustee could set aside a transfer
made between 90 days and one year before the date of the filing of the
petition if the creditor was an insider and had reasonable cause to be-
lieve the debtor was insolvent at the time of the transfer.122 The
amendment to section 547(b)(4)(B) allows the trustee to avoid such
transfers by the debtor to the creditor on proof only that the creditor
was an insider.123 Proof that the creditor had reasonable cause to be-
lieve the debtor was insolvent is no longer required to avoid the
transaction.
118. Id.
119. Id.
120. Bankruptcy Amendments Act, supra note 4, at 391. Section 1113(e) provides:
If during a period when the collective bargaining agreement continues in effect, and
if essential to the continuation of the debtor's business, or in order to avoid irreparable
damage to the estate, the court, after notice and a hearing, may authorize the trustee to
implement interim changes in the terms, conditions, wages, benefits, or work rules pro-
vided by a collective bargaining agreement . ...
121. Bankruptcy Amendments Act, supra note 4, at 391. Section 1113(f) reads: "No provi-
sion of this title shall be construed to permit a trustee to unilaterally terminate or alter any provi-
sions of a collective bargaining agreement prior to compliance with the provisions of this section."
122. 11 U.S.C. § 547(b)(4)(B) (1982).
123. Bankruptcy Amendments Act, supra note 4, at 378. As amended § 547(b)(4)(B) allows
the trustee to avoid any transfer of property by the debtor made "between ninety days and one
year before the date of the filing of the petition, if such creditor at the time of such transfer was
an insider."
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Under section 547(c)(2) an exception was made to the scope of
avoidable transfers for payments made in the ordinary course of busi-
ness. So long as payment was received within 45 days of the incurrence
of the obligation, the transfer was not considered a preference. 24 This
45 day limitation proved too restrictive as payment for ordinary busi-
ness debts might normally be made more than 45 days after the debt
was incurred. For this reason, the amendment to section 547 strikes
subsection (c)(2)(B). 25 Thus, if a transfer is made in the ordinary
course of business, it cannot be avoided as a preference.
An exception to avoidable transfers is made for consumers in a
new subsection (7) added to section 547(c). This addition prohibits a
trustee from avoiding a transfer of less than $600 by an individual con-
sumer debtor."2 6
A new subsection (g) is added to section 547 to specifically allo-
cate the burdens of proof between the parties to preference litigation.
The burden of proof on the avoidability of a transfer under section
547(b) is on the trustee.1 2 7 The burden of proof on the nonavoidability
of a transfer under section 547(c) is on the creditor or party against
whom the avoidance is sought.1 28
B. Other Amendments
The amendment to section 543(d) allows a custodian to continue
in possession of the debtor's property. Subsection (2) excuses the custo-
dian from turning over property of the debtor so long as the custodian
was appointed or took possession more than 120 days before the filing
of the bankruptcy petition.129 This provision promotes consistency by
allowing a receiver who has been controlling the debtor's property for
some period of time to continue in operation. The only exception to
124. II U.S.C. § 547(c)(2)(B) (1982).
125. Bankruptcy Amendments Act, supra note 4, at 378.
126. Id. at 355.
127. Id. at 378. Section 547(g) reads:
For the purposes of this section, the trustee has the burden of proving the
avoidability of a transfer under subsection (b) of this section, and the creditor or party
in interest against whom recovery or avoidance is sought has the burden of proving the
nonavoidability of a transfer under subsection (c) of this section.
128. Id.
129. Id. at 377. The amendment to § 543(d) provides that after notice and hearing, the
bankruptcy court:
(2) shall excuse compliance with subsections (a) and (b)(1) of this section if the
custodian is an assignee for the benefit of the debtor's creditors that was appointed or
took possession more than 120 days before the date of the filing of the petition, unless
compliance with such subsections is necessary to prevent fraud or injustice.
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allowing the custodian to continue in possession is when delivery of the
debtor's property to the trustee is necessary to prevent fraud or
injustice. 130
VII. CONCLUSION
Title III of the Bankruptcy Amendments Act of 1984 thoroughly
revises the substantive provisions of the Bankruptcy Act. Consumers
are now restricted in their use of practices which abused the spirit of
the Bankruptcy Act, yet protected in other areas so that the creditor
cannot take advantage of the bankruptcy system. The amendments pro-
tect grain producers who store grain in bankrupt facilities and require
expedition of claims of grain producers. Amendments to leasehold
management provisions ensure that shopping centers will remain stable
when one tenant in the center petitions for bankruptcy.
Two new sections were added: one to preserve the property inter-
ests of timeshare consumers during bankruptcy proceedings and one to
establish procedures to be used when rejecting collective bargaining
agreements. The rules for preferences were amended to enlarge the
scope of permissible transfers made prior to bankruptcy.
The bankruptcy amendments were enacted by Congress to remedy
problems existing in the Bankruptcy Act. Through additions and dele-
tions to the existing bankruptcy code, Congress attempted to cure in-
consistent interpretation and application of code provisions. The
amendments in title III of the Bankruptcy Amendments Act of 1984
reach this goal by answering questions about ambiguous provisions in
the Act, clarifying the procedural requirements of the Act, and setting
standards to be followed when litigating a case in bankruptcy.
130. Id.
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